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Abstract
Background: China’s long term Gini coefficient is higher than the international warning
line and the urban-rural income gap is still serious, meanwhile the transfer payments
targeted adjusting the income distribution are increasing in recent years, which indicate
that we should examine the impact of current transfer payment system on income gap.
Methods: By choosing Develop-the-west Strategy that is a quasi-natural experiment and
applying regression of discontinuity of location, using 1054 counties data of 15 provinces
in Midwestern China from 2000 to 2007, we analyze the impact of transfer payments on
urban-rural income gap in this paper.
Results: The results show that local government in western China paid more transfer
payments than in the central region, however, the income gap between urban-rural
residents in the western region increased by 20%. The widening effects are robust in
different bandwidth situation such as distance or latitude and longitude. Meanwhile, the
mechanism analyses find that urban residents benefit more than rural residents from
transfer payments.
Conclusions: Therefore, we believe that transfer payments should be more targeted to
invest in rural areas, at the same time, the central government should rationalize the
structure of transfer payments as soon as possible, and correct the urban bias and
structure bias of local fiscal expenditure.
Keywords: Transfer payments, Urban-rural income gap, Regression of discontinuity
Background
Since the tax reform in 1994, the basic pattern with the revenue centralization and ex-
penditure decentralization in the relationship between the central and local allocation
gradually formed. Local government has undertaken the responsibility of providing most
of public service in a local region. The transfer payment system that is also known as the
fiscal transfer payment system or local transfer payment system from central to local has
been established and gradually perfected. Because of the large difference between differ-
ent financial local governments, the government in the poverty-stricken areas appeared
to be inadequate and the ability to regulate the income gap is minimal, which heavily de-
pends on the central transfer. The data from the ministry of finance show that the trans-
fer payment from the central government to the local government in 2014 reaches 4.66
billion yuan. In 2015, it is expected to reach 5.1 billion yuan.1 Nevertheless, China’s long-
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term Gini coefficient is higher than the international warning line with 0.4. The Gini coef-
ficient of residents issued by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2014 is 0.469, and the in-
come gap between urban and rural areas is still serious, which indicates that on the one
hand, the current income distribution in China still has a lot of convergence space. On
the other hand, we should also examine the impact of the current transfer payment sys-
tem on the income gap. At the beginning of the year of 2015, the State Council issued the
“opinions on the reform and promotion of transfer payment system from central to local,”
which is committed to further improve the transfer payment system, especially to pro-
mote the interregional equalization of basic public services as the main target and to pro-
mote the sustained and healthy development of economy and society. Therefore, the
research on the transfer payment’s effect on the income gap between urban and rural
areas has important theoretical and practical significance, which is related to the imple-
mentation of fiscal policy to promote the balanced development of regional economy and
also is directly related with the prospect and future of China’s economic growth.
The current literature in this area mainly takes the residents of metastatic income as
the breakthrough point and analyzes the direct regulating function of transfer payment
in income distribution (Wang and Caminada 2011; Albouy 2012; etc.). However, the
transfer income contains not only the direct central subsidies but also the subsidies
from local levels. In fact, the local governments rely heavily on the higher transfer pay-
ment. From the perspective of local government implementing the transfer payments
purely, research on the role of income redistribution of higher levels could be focused
on, but such studies are rare. The current literature can be divided into three categor-
ies: first is the research about transfer payment with the policy target on resident in-
come. Meng (2013) evaluates the policy effect of “8-7 poverty assistance,” estimates
with the income of national poverty county as the breakpoint, and suggests that the
poverty county farmers’ income significantly increase by 38%. From the perspective of
poverty gap in county farmers, the poverty alleviation policy and poverty subsidies are
still not effective (Yao and Wang 2009; Park and Wang 2010). Second is the research
on the effect of transfer payment structure on regional income. Lu and Chen (2012)
used the method of marginal revenue analysis and found that the general transfer pay-
ment subsidies benefit the poor area more while the failure of equitable distribution is
possible in the marginal benefit distribution of special transfer payments. Third is the
research on the effect of transfer payment on local government behavior. Wagener
(2000) found externality existed in the implementation of central policy by local gov-
ernment through the theoretical model, which has an effect on policy implementation.
He and Dong (2015) suggested that the transfer payment played an incentive effect on
improving people’s livelihood based on residents’ happiness maximization to analyze
the mechanism of transfer payment on expenditure behavior. Zeng and Hu (2009) the-
oretically analyzed the fiscal system in China and suggested that the central, provincial,
and municipal government expenditure have urban bias, which makes the country and
township governments with the financial difficulties have to take the responsibility of pro-
viding public goods and to strengthen the urban-rural income gap. Due to the asymmetric
information, Yin and Zhu (2011) found that as a result of a government pursuing eco-
nomic growth rate rather than the welfare of the residents, the public service-oriented
government had financial expenditure bias deviating from the goal of construction. Im-
portant progress has been made in the current literature, and shortcomings still exist,
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such as first, the model design in the empirical analysis of the current related research still
has the endogeneity problem of the urban and rural residents’ income in the implementa-
tion of transfer payments. Due to the interference of other factors, the consistent esti-
mates are difficult to be obtained, which reduces the credibility of conclusions and policy
recommendations. Second is that the policy evaluation of transfer payment is focused on
the poverty alleviation to farmers’ income, which makes it necessary to verify the different
effect of transfer payment on income gap between urban and rural areas. Third is that
manipulation is possible in making the residents’ income as the breakpoints, and it is ne-
cessary to verify the empirical results with the strong exogeneity of instrumental variables.
Fourth is that the current literature about the urban and rural income gap is based on the
national or provincial level; the county level is still to be further studied.
Therefore, as for the important endogeneity problem, this paper tries to use the most effect-
ive design in the quasi-natural experiments, which is also called the regression of discontinuity.
In line with the assumption of the RD model, it can be more effective to deal with the impact
of endogenous problems and can also improve the accuracy to deal with the impact of en-
dogenous problems. It is still relatively rare to use the model to analyze the fiscal problems.
This paper selects the execution variable that has the distance of RD function within the west-
ern geographic dividing line, which can capture the unobserved factors that are related to the
western dividing line in a certain sense. More convincing county data can be used to analyze
the regulation effect of transfer payment on urban-rural income gap. Empirical results show
that China’s transfer payment regulating the regional financial balance will expand the income
gap between urban and rural areas. The mechanism analysis results show that the transfer pay-
ment has a significant promoting effect on the urban residents’ income while having a minor
effect on the rural residents’ income. Whether the empirical conclusions that are obtained ac-
cording to the regression of discontinuity in the middle and western regions are applicable to
the effect of transfer payment on other regions is a further research. There is no effective em-
pirical evidence or institutional differences to deny the applicability of this argument. The
expending gap in the urban-rural income is not only the hidden trouble in our social stability
but also the important academic content. The regression of discontinuity that has a focus on
transfer payment can, to a certain extent, enrich the extents and methods in the field.
The theoretical analysis of transfer payment’s effect on income gap between urban and
rural areas
In the background of fiscal decentralization, the unequal rather than the scarcity is fo-
cused on. The regulation of income redistribution and the effective processing of competi-
tion between local governments are root in the appropriate intervention of central
government, which forms the transfer payment (Oates 2005). As for the backward area,
the state formally proposed the strategy of a large-scale development of the western re-
gion. The central government gradually increased the capital investment strength in the
western region since 2000. The accumulative financial center has transfer payments to the
western region of 8.5 billion yuan, accounting for 40% of the total transfer payments over
the same period.2 What the central government clearly put forward increased transfer
payments, special grant funds, subsidies in ethnic minority areas, rural tax reform subsid-
ies, and township financial difficulty subsidies on the western region, which aims to dir-
ectly achieve gap convergence effect of regional development and residents’ income.
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Theoretically, transfer payments are given to function of balancing regional financial
resources and equalizing public services (Boadway and Shah 2007). However, after the
tax system reform, the practical significance on the separation system is not formed.
With the pressure of central financial centralization and local expenditure, as well as
with the restriction of a household registration system in the long-term urban-rural
dual structure, a population cannot fully flow, which makes the transfer payment of
central to local governments as an important tool to ensure that the local residents
enjoy basic public services. Thus, this paper uses the non-completely free-flowing fiscal
decentralization model constructed by Wagener (2000) and Liu (2011). The difference
is that we begin with the local government transferring for higher governments as the
final executors and theoretically analyze the effect of local government behavior on the
transfer payment’s function of reducing urban and rural residents’ income gap.
We assume that there are only central and local governments in one county.
The transfer from central to local is T, and the local government behavior directly
affects the externalities of social production. The two regions i are 1 and 2. There
are two groups v in each region, which is represented by u, r. One is the rich
group that possesses the fixed factor, namely, urban resident. The other is the
floating workforce, namely, rural resident. The total number of the floating popula-
tion is:
Lr ¼ l1r þ l2r ð1Þ
We define the per transfer payment provided by the local government to group V in
the region i, then:
T
i ¼ Tiu þ Tir ð2Þ
In a simple market economy, the labor market is competitive. The production




is strictly concave. The marginal output is the level wage.
Then the average income of rural residents and urban residents can be expressed
as:
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Equation 10 indicates that the rural residents can be possible benefitting from the
transfer payments. But the size of benefits is related to the externality of local govern-
ment behavior. Equation 11 indicates that the reaction of urban residents’ income level
on transfer payment also depends on the interaction between urban and rural areas.
Therefore, it only needs to be compared the changing rates of transfer payment in rural
and urban areas to reflect the income gap between these areas. We thus propose a
hypothesis of this study that in the premise that the influence of another variable being
controlled, if the reaction of urban on transfer payment is more sensitive than that of
rural, then the local government’s function of income redistribution and regulation may
be influenced by the policy trade-offs, which widens the income gap phenomenon.
Methods
Empirical model and data description
The empirical model
Using OLS regression to analyze formula 12, the subscript i represents the country and t
represents the year. Among them, transfer represents the transfer payments, and the esti-
mates of φ represent the effect of transfer payment on urban-rural income gap. X is the
control variable, which controls the provinces and time effect. ξ is the error term. However,
the OLS regression still cannot accurately control the unobservable or unmeasured variable,
such as geography resources, local customs and habits, consumption habits, culture, and re-
ligion, which is likely to affect the income level of local residents. Therefore, φ would inevit-
ably overestimate or underestimate its effect on income gap between urban and rural areas.
Gapit ¼ ωþ φTransferit þ υXit þ μi þ ηt þ ξ it ð12Þ
In order to overcome the endogeneity problem, referring to the idea of Almond et al.
(2009) about the effect of heating influence with the sub-boundary of north and south
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on life value, this paper uses the fuzzy regression of discontinuity with the sub-
boundary of Midwest3. FRD thinks the breakpoint is nondeterministic, which relies on
the non-continuity of treatment probability of a performing variable. The execution
variable is the location while the processing variable is whether the transfer payment
can be enjoyed. However, the processing variable is not strictly dependent on the geo-
graphic location, which means the breakpoint changes of the transfer payment are not
strictly determined by the western region. In the practical work, the western region of
Hunan Province, Enshi area of Hubei Province, and Yanbian area of Jilin Province in
the central province enjoy the western development policy as a western region. There-
fore, geographical discontinuity can be regarded as the instrumental variables in the
processing state, and 2SLS regression estimation can be used.
Transferit ¼ αþ βWesti þ δF distanceð Þi þ γΧit þ μi þ ηt þ εit ð13Þ
Infrastructureit ¼ α1 þ β1Westi þ δ1F dis tan ceð Þi þ γ1Xit þ μi þ ηt þ ςit ð14Þ
Taxit ¼ α2 þ β2Westi þ δ2F distanceð Þi þ γ2Χit þ μi þ ηt þ ψit ð15Þ
Gapit ¼ θþ λTransferhatit þ πF distanceð Þi þ κXit þ μi þ ηt þ ζ it ð16Þ
The first stage regression equation is 13 and the second stage regression equation is
16. β captures the discontinuity effect of central government’s transfer payment on the
western region. λ represents the effect of transfer payment on income gap between
rural and urban, which is the coefficient of the paper focused on. The sample we use in
this paper is the adjacent county in the western geographic division line. The social and
economic characteristics of countries and cities surrounding the boundary line are con-
sidered to be the same. Western counties are regarded as the processing group, which
means the value of west is 1 while the central regions are regarded as the controlling
group, which means the value of west is 0. F (distance) represents the RD function
form with the distance as executive variable, which can capture the relative unobserved
factors in the boundary line of central and western boundaries in a sense. It is reflected
as the function of controlling geographic location. Moreover, although the nonparamet-
ric statistic method does not depend on the specific function form, the data is required
to actually reflect the actual geographic information of each observed value (Black 1999),
and the model is required to be with a large number of observation samples close to the
critical value (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Due to the restriction of detailed data informa-
tion, this paper refers to the relatively flexible semiparametric regression of discontinuity
model suggested by Dell (2010). In order to ensure the robustness of empirical results, the
form with different orders is used, and the individual characteristics that are not changing
with time and the changing trend that is changing with time are controlled. At this time,
the separated error term is independent with key variables. Moreover, with the premise
hypothesis that the distribution of the controlled variable around the critical value is
continuity, only the optimal bandwidth needs to be controlled. Whether other variables
are controlled or not would have no greater impact on the regression results. However,
the selection of optimal bandwidth can only be close to the critical values of an executive
variable in the actual operation. Therefore, the controlled variable can be added in the
regression to improve the estimation efficiency.
It needs to be explained that due to the majority and complexity of a western develop-
ment policy, it not only involves the significant differences of transfer payment in the
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Midwest but also involves the capital investment, preferential tax policies, and other related
industrial policies in western infrastructure construction4. In order to ensure these policies
have no influence on the effect of transfer payment on income gap between urban and rural,
it is necessary to verify whether the discontinuity points exist around the western boundary
line in addition to the transfer payment. This paper summarizes the other two major vari-
ables in the western development strategy policy, namely, the interpreted variable of infra-
structure construction funds. This paper uses a variable of per capital basic construction
investment amount and an explanatory variable of tax preferential policies in Eq. 15. This
paper uses the indicator of macro tax burden level.
Data description
The State Council issued the notice “the implementation views of policies and measures
on great western development” and identified the region of western development: Chong-
qing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Inner
Mongolia, and Guangxi. The Midwest (excluding in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet5) in
this paper contains 1054 counties in 15 provinces as the sample data.
Urban-rural income gap (Gap): According to the current literature, the urban and rural
income in national or provincial and municipal levels should be represented with the ratio
of per capital disposable income in urban and per capita net income in rural. However,
the county-level data used in this paper is from “China Statistical Yearbook for Regional
Economy” (2001–2008). This yearbook only covers the average wage income of workers
in urban residents and residents’ per capita net income. Although replacing the urban dis-
posable income level with the wage income would be an overestimation, this paper studies
the changing trend of income gap between urban and rural areas. The changing trend of
income levels and disposable income levels is the same. Although there are deviations, it
still illustrates the problem, which has some credibility to a certain extent. Moreover, in
comparison with the ratio of average income in provincial town on-the-job workers and
the net income in rural residents and the ratio of per capital disposable income in provin-
cial urban residents and the net income in rural residents, we find that the correlation co-
efficient is 0.8226, which is significant at 1% level. It has certain representativeness
regarding the ratio of average wage income of on-the-job workers and the per capita net
income in rural residents as the income gap between urban and rural areas.
Transfer: The data is from the “Financial Statistical Data in the National Counties”
(2001-2007).6
The transfer payment used in this paper has eliminated the tax rebates and original
system of subsidy7. This is because the transfer payment is to maintain the local vested
interests before the tax reform, and higher income leads to more return funds and subsid-
ies. Since the absolute amount of transfer payment cannot be directly compared, this
paper selects the relative amount of transfer payment, which means that regarding the
fiscal revenue (financial strength at the beginning of the period in each area) as the base
to calculate the relative variation of transfer payment each year after 2000. Other control
variables are from the “Social Economic Statistical Yearbook in Counties of China” and
CEIC database, which have a more unified macro data statistics as shown in Table 1.
Note that with the central and western province boundary line as the discontinuity,
the relative distance from the left of the boundary line is negative and the relative dis-
tance from the right of the boundary line is positive. The level of tax burden is
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measured by the macro tax burden standard, which is represented by the ratio of local
fiscal revenue and GDP. The urbanization rate is the ratio of non-agriculture population
and total population. The balance of financial institutions loan at the end of the year is
the natural logarithm of the ratio of balance of financial institutions loan at the
end of the year and GDP. The proportion of students in the school is the ratio of
elementary school students’ number and the total population number.
Results and discussion
The regression results and analysis
The regression results of OLS
Table 2 shows the regression results of formula 12. The first column is the results of
pooled OLS regression for the full sample. The variation of transfer payment expands
Table 1 Statistical feature of the main variables





Income gap between urban and
rural areas
Gap 6520 5.679404 2.810724 1.332908 23.24396
Transfer payment Transfer 8053 4.772247 7.482760 0.047015 94.20853
Western region or not West 8432 0.598672 0.490196 0 1
Distance Distance 8432 −1.234651 4.656160 −16.25232 8.757799
Per capital basic construction
investment(10,000 yuan/person)
Infrastructure 8224 0.177283 0.317755 0.001079 5.454545
Tax burden level Tax 8051 0.041999 0.016694 0.017679 0.078604
Per capital GDP(10,000 yuan/person) Gdpper 8340 0.577577 0.487237 0.050675 7.516575
Proportion of the first industry Pindustry 8238 0.320898 0.146475 0.005649 0.987018
Proportion of the second industry Sindustry 8234 0.355314 0.167509 0.005645 0.986210
Per capita fiscal revenue(10,000
yuan/person)
Grper 7981 0.024567 0.033896 0.001671 1.112006
Urbanization rate Urban 8101 0.142832 0.094575 0 1
Population density Densitypop 8253 0.026757 0.023495 0.000014 0.151786
Balance of financial institutions loan
at the end of the year
LnLoan 8233 11.26259 1.038916 5.743003 13.99783
Percentage of students in school Students 8254 0.059936 0.018160 0.000418 0.252336
Table 2 Results of OLS regression































R2 0.461 0.611 0.546 0.536 0.526 0.546 0.557
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5825 5825 1894 1480 1273 1048 850
Note: The values in the brackets represent the standard deviation of cluster robust. The third and seventh columns are
estimated by the two-way fixed effect with the local samples
*** represents the significant level at 1%
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the income gap between urban and rural areas for 10.8% with the significant level at 1%.
The second column represents the regression of two-way fixed effects with the coefficient φ
of 10.3%, which indicates the effect of transfer payment on urban-rural income gap is posi-
tive in the conditions at county-level clustering. In addition, from the perspective of a local
sample, which is shown from the third column to the seventh column, we can see from the
regression of the local sample that is around the western boundary line in the scope of
200 km to 75 km that the coefficient of transfer payment on urban-rural income gap is be-
tween 11 and 13%, which has the pulling effect on income gap between urban and rural.
Discontinuity regression
This paper uses the function form of distance as the discontinuity regression results. For
RD estimation, the graphic method is an important step to illustrate a problem and also
an effective method to test whether the conditions can be met or not (Lee and Lemieux
2010). Samples are limited within the western boundary line of 150 km, drawing the scat-
terplot of execution variables about the income gap between transfer payment and urban-
rural income gap with the three items of distance as the RD function form, which is
shown in Table 2. The top left image of Fig. 1 shows there is a discontinuity point at the
western boundary line of critical value, which indicates that the transfer payment obtained
in the western region is higher than that in the middle. The top left image of Fig. 1 shows
the imbalance phenomenon that the income gap in the western region is higher than that
in middle region. In addition, there is no obvious difference in the infrastructure construc-
tion fund investment and tax burden around the central and western boundary line, and
the critical value of boundary line is continuous.
Figure 1 initially shows that the increasing transfer payment contributes to the im-
provement of the income gap between urban and rural areas. However, whether it has
a negative effect or not depends on the model estimation. From Fig. 1, the three items
of distance can better fit the distribution of scattered points and the three items of
distance are used in the regression as the RD function form. At the same time, taking
into account the need of selecting multiple bandwidths around the breakpoint, the
regression results would not change along with the change of bandwidth. According to
Fig. 1 The discontinuity map in the first phase and the map of the gap between urban and rural
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the calculation of optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012),
the optimal bandwidth is about 200 km, and this paper selects the sample scope of 150,
125, 100, and 75 km for the local regression.
The result of the first stage regression is shown in Table 3, and the discontinuity
effect of these three major polices is summarized. Taking into account the heteroske-
dasticity, this paper uses the county cluster robust standard errors, and all the models
are controlled at the provincial level and time effect. Overall, only the transfer payment
has the significant differences in the Midwest with the significant level of 5%. The infra-
structure fund investment and tax incentives in the central and western regions have
no obvious discontinuity. Among them, the explanatory variable in panel 1 is transfer
payment. The sample is in the scope of 200 km around the western border, and the
regression coefficient β is significantly positive at 1%. Along with the shrinking band-
width, even though the sample is limited to the range of 75 km, the regression coeffi-
cient decreases but is significantly positive. The regression results show that the
transfer payment counties around the Midwest boundary line have differences. The
local government that is incorporated into the strategic policy of the western region
can enjoy more financial capital injection. At the same time, from the regression results
of panel 2, whether the sample is within 200 km or 75 km, the infrastructure construc-
tion fund investments in the counties around the Midwest boundary line have no sig-
nificant differences, which is due to the infrastructure invested by central government
containing the transport channel connecting between the western region and its sur-
roundings. Similarly, due to the fact the preferential tax treatment in the Midwest re-
gion is directly referred to the east region during the reform and opening up in a large
Table 3 Regression results of the first phase
























F (distance) Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.369 0.364 0.366 0.372 0.369












F (distance) Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.264 0.243 0.232 0.211 0.201












F (distance) Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.097 0.097 0.093 0.134 0.145
Observations 2659 2110 1805 1485 1192
Note: The value in the brackets represents the standard deviation of cluster robust, and the province effect and time
effect are controlled
*** and ** represent the significant level at 1 and 5%, respectively
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extent, the middle regions also enjoy a similar privilege. Therefore, the tax preferential
policies in the Midwest region did not show a significant difference; panel 3 reflects the
inference.
The regression results of the second stage are shown in Table 4. The first column limits
the sample within the boundary line of 200 km/h. The coefficient is 23.4% with the signifi-
cant level at 1% when the function of RD form is regressed. The coefficient decreases
slightly when the quadratic distance is regressed with the value of 21.1% while the coeffi-
cient remains unchanged when the three terms of distance are regressed with the value of
21.1% at the significant level of 1%. Along with the continued shrinking bandwidth, the
coefficient is significant at the level of 1% when the sample is limited in the range of
75 km around the distance boundary line and is regressed with the low-order term. When
regressed with a higher item, the significance of coefficient is declining but still significant
at the level of 5%. On the one hand, it is due to the sample being limited in a small scope
as much as possible, and fewer observation points lead to the results not significant. On
the other hand, when the distance is smaller and the fitting form is more close to the lin-
ear function form, the significance of the regression results with three or four terms of
distance is declining. If the regression of an optimal bandwidth with 200 km calculated
with the method of IK is regarded as the benchmark, it can be considered that 1% change
in the transfer payment will lead to the widening gap between urban and rural income for
20 to 30%, which indicates that the blindly increase of local government transfer payment
cannot attain the intention of balance in urban and rural income. From Table 4, the
sample is still large enough when the bandwidth is adjusted from 200 to 75 km. The con-
clusion of this paper about the effect of transfer payment in the Midwest counties on the
income gap between urban and rural areas is representative.
Table 4 Regression results with F (distance)
Gap (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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F (distance) Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
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F (distance) Quartic Quartic Quartic Quartic Quartic
R2 0.446 0.426 0.405 0.425 0.322
Observations 2043 1599 1371 1122 904
Note: The same with Table 3
Lei et al. China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:20 Page 11 of 17
The robustness test
First, in order to accurately reflect the geographical factors in different counties to control
the differences in the Midwest, this paper regressed with the multi-discontinuity from the
perspective of dual dimensions (the longitude and latitude difference with the Midwest
boundary line), namely, the F (distance) in formulas 13 and 16 is replaced by F (longitude,
latitude). Table 5 shows that the transfer payment has no effect on narrowing the income
gap between urban and rural. The extent of expanding effect is the same with the regres-
sion results with the distance as the executive variable. Even if the observation point is re-
duced to the boundary line with 75 km, the coefficient is significant at 1% level, which is
higher than that of the sample high away from the boundary line. This indicates that the
expanding effect transfer payment on income gap between urban and rural has limited
significance in the Midwest boundary line.
Second, in accordance with the design requirements of discontinuity regression model,
the unobservable factors in the processing and control group are similar in principal. There-
fore, joining the control variable or not has no effect on the final results. But in order to im-
prove the efficiency of estimation, we add the control variable in Table 6 and compare the
sensitivity of one-time addition method with the gradually adding method that refers to
Altonji et al. (2005) and Dahlberg et al. (2008). The result has no difference with no adding
variable, which indicates the effectiveness of instrumental variables8. When the observation
distance is limited to the boundary line with 75 km, the regression results are significant at
the 1% level. Therefore, the regression results with the control variable verify the robustness
of the results. In addition, the regression result is consistent when changing the sample.9
Effectiveness test
According to the validity of standard in Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the feasibility of
RD regression in this paper is reflected in the following: (1) in the density continuity of
execution variable, the sample used in this paper has no disadvantage. Since the obser-
vations around the boundary line can be mapped with clear position, this verifies the
assumption rationality of geographic discontinuity regression, which is the characteris-
tic of this model (Keele and Titiunik 2015). (2) In addition to the policy discontinuity,
other effects change along with the geographical location. If the jumping occurs, the
estimation results in the model also capture effect of other variables on the income gap
between rural and urban. Other factors that influence the resident income contain the
related controlling factors, the sample within 100 km around the Midwest boundary
line, and the three items of boundary distance as the RD formula. From the regression
Table 5 Regression results with F (longitude, latitude)
Gap (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






















Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.464 0.440 0.542 0.466 0.401
Observations 2043 1599 1371 1122 904
Note: The same with Table 3
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results in Table 7, the factors have no significant differences in the Midwest region,
which verifies the effectiveness of conclusion in this paper,
Above all, this paper draws the conclusion that transfer payment contributes to the
inequality of urban-rural income through the analysis of discontinuity regression of
transfer payment on income gap between urban and rural. This paper acquires the con-
sistent results of robustness check. In addition, the effective test results verify the feasi-
bility of transfer payment on income gap between urban and rural.
Analysis of mechanism
Since the index of income gap between urban and rural is measured by the ratio
of urban residents’ wages and rural residents’ net income, the above results show
that the increasing relative transfer payment amount leads to the expanding of in-
come gap between rural and urban for 20%. Then how does the urban and rural
residents’ income change? In this regard, this paper takes the incremental income
level of urban and rural residents’ income as the explanatory variables. Results in
Table 8 show that the coefficient of transfer payment on the incremental income
of urban residents’ income is significantly positive at the 5% level. Benefit of rural
residents is small, and it is significant at the 10% level when the sample is within
75 km around the boundary line. On the basis of previous studies, this paper put
forward the inherent mechanism of the influence; on the one hand, it is the ten-
dency of local fiscal expenditure. The local fiscal expenditure tends to be invested
in the urban areas with more sensitivity. In comparison with rural areas, urban
areas benefit more in the transfer payment, which is the result of different systems
in different regions. There are other scholars suggesting that the conclusion of fis-
cal expenditure has the characteristic of urbanization bias such as Lei and Cai
(2012). On the other hand, with the asymmetric information, the structure of local
Table 7 Effectiveness test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Explanatory variable Gdpper Pindustry Sindustry Urban Students Grper LnLoan Densitypop
West −0.0212 −0.0569 0.0633 0.0375 −0.00258 0.00250 0.364 −0.00259
(0.0966) (0.0368) (0.0497) (0.0422) (0.00248) (0.00533) (0.279) (0.00360)
F (distance) Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.291 0.398 0.212 0.122 0.382 0.176 0.229 0.126
Observations 1505 1556 1501 1437 1498 1472 1496 1496
Note: The same with Table 3
Table 6 Regression results when adding the controlled variable
Gap (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




















F (distance) Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.549 0.537 0.524 0.540 0.545
Observations 1894 1480 1273 1048 850
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The same with Table 3
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Table 8 Regression results of effect of transfer payment on income level of urban and rural residents
Explanatory variable The increment of income level of urban residents The increment of income level of rural residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




















Transfer 40.44** 41.32** 40.54** 53.29** 97.75** 0.929 2.235 3.710 6.925* 14.82*
(17.42) (18.71) (18.58) (22.22) (48.40) (2.021) (2.230) (2.746) (3.746) (7.980)
F (distance) Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic
R2 0.232 0.210 0.320 0.312 0.237 0.076 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.053
Observations 2025 1591 1352 1091 874 1848 1448 1247 1035 829













fiscal expenditure is biased. The rural areas that really need financial support do
not enjoy the full benefits. The infrastructure is more backward and self-
development is lower in the poorer areas. Only limited funds can be used to give
priority to infrastructure and administration project, and there is fewer fiscal funds
being used in the construction of people’s livelihood project (Fu and Shen 2012).
This explains the reason why the income level of rural residents has not been sig-
nificantly improved to a certain extent.
Just as the theoretical model reflects, rural residents can benefit from the transfer
payment, but its size has externality with government behavior. If the urban area is
more sensitive to the transfer payment, local government may be weighted in the policy
in order to expand the urban and rural income gap.
Conclusions
The geographic information is used in the local polynomial RD model to analyze the im-
pact of transfer payment on urban-rural income gap. In comparison with other research,
the executive variable of western geographic boundaries of distance, in a certain sense,
captures the relative unobserved factors around the Midwest boundary line, effectively
overcomes the endogeneity problem, greatly improves estimation accuracy of transfer
payment effect on income gap, and examines the robustness of results and validity of
model. The results show that transfer payment will expand the rural-urban income gap
when regulating the equilibrium of regional finance. If most of the transfer payment con-
tinues to be used in an urban area or infrastructure by local government to make achieve-
ments in short time with neglecting the special care in peoples’ livelihood project, then
even the amount of transfer payment funds is huge, and narrowing the income gap be-
tween urban and rural would be of no avail. Therefore, in the process of transfer payment
system reform and improvement, in addition to strictly implementing the “notices on
reforming and improving the central’s transfer payment to local government,” according
to the analysis results, policy suggestions are as follows: (1) empirical results show transfer
payment has a significant expanding effect on rural-urban income gap. Central govern-
ment should adjust the structure of transfer payment to gradually increase the general
transfer payment and to improve the degree of freedom of local governments in address-
ing fiscal expenditure and at the same time integrating the special transfer payments with
the principles of zero growth or little decrease. The increasing capital should show the
rural tendency and focus on improving the rural residents of people’s livelihood. The in-
fluence mechanism analysis shows that the expanding effect of transfer payment on rural-
urban income gap is due to benefit of rural residents being less than that of urban resi-
dents. Therefore, it is important to constraint the local government behavior that imple-
ments policies of transfer payment. First, government function should change into “public
service” and correct bias problem of fiscal expenditure structure. Second, a rural area
should be paid attention in financial expenditure, especially in the construction of rural
livelihood projects. It should be committed to promoting the equalization of public ser-
vices in urban and rural areas and to effectively ease the problem of expanding income
gap between rural and urban. (2) From a point of view, using efficiency and coverage of
transfer payment by local government is to be improved. It is necessary to perfect the
transfer payment system in a county and establish fiscal expenditure performance
accountability.
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Endnotes
1Source: “Ministry of finance budget department: tax return from central to local and
budget of transfer payment in 2015”, Ministry of finance, March 24, 2015
2Source: liu Qiong: “The total transfer payment from central government financial to
the west is 8.5 billion,” Xinhua, October 22, 2013
3The regression model of discontinuity is one of the most advanced quasi-natural ex-
periment designs in the empirical methods. It has been highly valued and applied in
many fields, such as economics, political economics, education, biology, and behavior,
but it is seldom used in the field of finance and taxation at present.
4Targeted measures are implemented by the central, which includes the inclined fiscal
policy, financial development policies, preferential tax policies, natural resource pol-
icies, and public service policies. Related policies can be summarized into three cat-
egories: transfer payments, fund investment, and tax incentives, which promote the
infrastructure construction. Among them, the funds in the financial development pol-
icy, resources industry, and public services policy that aim to promote west develop-
ment are invested in infrastructure, which includes roads, railways, and water. The
preferential tax policy is to promote the tax preferential policies of economic and social
development, which involves income tax, value-added tax, tariff, farmland occupation
tax, resource tax, and other taxes. For the tax incentives, the main beneficiaries are en-
terprise unit.
5The Mongolia Autonomous Region, as the western part of China, has only a small
part that is adjacent with Shanxi Province, other parts are adjacent to Hebei Province.
Therefore, excluding the small part of Mongolia has no much influence in comparing
with the Midwest region. The data of Xinjiang and Tibet is missing and the characteris-
tic of discontinuity regression model is the optimal estimation of local validity, which
requires the sample to be controlled around the range of discontinuity and seeks the
optimal bandwidth. Therefore, taking no consideration of these two regions has no
much influence on the results.
6The statistic is compiled by the State Department of Ministry of Finance. The official
statistics are only updated until 2009. Taking the consideration of the impact of finan-
cial budget system reform on the statistical caliber after 2007, this paper uses the data
from 2000 to 2007.
7The transfer payment = special subsidies + transfer payment subsides + transfer
payment in ethnic areas + taxation expenses allowance in rural + transfer payment subsides
in teachers of primary and secondary school + additional issuance of treasury bonds subsid-
iary + additional wage subsidies in arduous remote areas + settlement allowance + increase
or reduce subsidies in the adjustment income assignment + other income + provincial grants
to municipalities + other funds + other benefits
8Due to space limitation, only the results of the regression that adds the controlled
variable are listed in Table 6. In the local sample, the regression results have no more
changes when adding the economic level (per capital GDP, proportion of first industry,
proportion of second industry), financial level (per capital revenue, macro tax burden
level, infrastructure investment level), population level (urbanization rate population
density), and proportion of balance of financial institutions loan and that of students in
school.
9Due to space limitation, the author can provide if required.
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